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Abstract
Strategic argumentation provides a simple model
of disputation and negotiation among agents. Al-
though agents might be expected to act in our best
interests, there is little that enforces such behaviour.
(Maher, 2016) introduced a model of corruption
and resistance to corruption within strategic argu-
mentation. In this paper we identify corrupt be-
haviours that are not detected in that formulation.
We strengthen the model to detect such behaviours,
and show that, under the strengthened model, all
the strategic aims in (Maher, 2016) are resistant to
corruption.
Introduction
Strategic argumentation is an incomplete-knowledge game
in which competing players take turns in adding arguments
to a common pool of arguments such that at the end of a
player’s turn that player’s strategic aim is (usually temporar-
ily) achieved. A player loses when she cannot successfully
complete her turn. Each player knows only her own argu-
ments and the arguments in the common pool.
This gives a simple but insightful model of disputation
and negotiation. It is particularly suited as the basis for
legal disputation between software agents.1 A wide vari-
ety of research has shown that defeasible rules, which can
be combined to create arguments, are effective in represent-
ing contracts and legal reasoning [Prakken and Sartor, 1998;
Reeves et al., 2002; Grosof, 2004]. However, there remains
the question of trusting the software agents.
[Maher, 2016b; Maher, 2016a] investigates what occurs
when agents/players corrupt the game by violating the as-
sumed privacy of a player’s arguments. Two cases are of cor-
ruption are considered: espionage, in which a player learns
the arguments of her opponent, with her opponent unaware,
and collusion, in which two players plan their play together in
order to make a specific player win. An instance of collusion
is outlined in the following example.
1 For example, we can imagine agents with access to licensing
agreements and copyright law negotiating on take-down notices for
claimed copyright infringement.
Example 1 Consider the arguments in Figure 1, where ver-
tices are arguments (grey if they can be played by P , white
for O) and edges are attacks of one argument on another. Ac-
cepting argument A is P ’s strategic aim. Normal play would
proceed as follows: P plays A, O plays B1 (thus defeating
A), P plays C (restoring A by defeating B1), and O plays D
(defeating C, and allowing B1 to defeat A). Thus, normally,
P loses.
However, P andO might collude to ensure P wins by play-
ing as follows: P plays A, O plays B1 and B2, and P plays C
(restoring A). P now wins because O has no effective move:
to play D would have no effect because it is defeated by B1.
This sequence of moves might also occur if O committed es-
pionage on P in order to ensure P wins.
A B1 C
DB2
Figure 1: A strategic argumentation game.
Clearly, in this example, the playing of B2 is foolish, and
might be considered a sign of incompetence or corruption.
However, the model of [Maher, 2016b] permits this play. In-
deed, it might be argued that, in general, the playing of mul-
tiple arguments by O further restricts the possible responses
of P , because those arguments might attack arguments that
P otherwise might have played. On the other hand, the pri-
vacy ofO’s arguments can be seen as a strategic advantage, in
which case playing multiple arguments is surrendering some
of this advantage.
Although playing B2 ends badly for O in this example, we
cannot consider it a sign of corruption if there are other cir-
cumstances in which playing B2 would improve the chances
of O. And even if playing B2 is uniformly bad, there is still
the question of why? Is it because O did not play the mini-
mum number of arguments to achieve her aim (as might be
suggested from the surrendering strategic advantage line of
thought), or is it because O did not play a minimal set of ar-
guments that achieved her aim? (In this example the two are
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
13
11
5v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 30
 A
ug
 20
20
NP Σp2
⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
P ∆p2 ∆
p
3 ⊆ · · · ⊆ NPPP ⊆ NPNP
PP · · · ⊆ PSPACE
⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆
coNP Πp2
Figure 2: Some complexity classes in the polynomial counting hierarchy, ordered by containment.
the same, but in general they are different.) Or is it because
B2 attacks one of O’s own arguments, thus causing a self-
inflicted injury? Answers to these questions will enable us to
insist on a stronger standard of behaviour from players, which
will make corruption harder to disguise.
In the following, we show that non-minimal sets of ar-
guments are dominated by the corresponding minimal sets.
(Consequently, there is no circumstance in which playing B2
has a positive effect.) By imposing the standard that play-
ers may only play minimal sets we make it harder to perform
collusion. Furthermore, we show that this higher standard on
players also improves resistance to collusion.
Background
Abstract Argumentation
This work is based on abstract argumentation in the sense of
[Dung, 1995], which addresses the evaluation of a static set
of arguments. An argumentation framework A = (S,)
consists of a finite set of arguments S and a binary relation
 over S, called the attack (sometimes, defeat) relation. If
(a, b) ∈ we write a  b and say that a attacks b. We
say there is a conflict between arguments a1 and a2 if either
a1  a2 or a2  a1. A set of arguments S′ ⊆ S is conflict-
free if the restriction of to S′ is empty. The semantics of
an argumentation framework is given in terms of extensions,
which are conflict-free subsets of S.
Given an argumentation framework, an argument a is said
to be accepted in an extension E if a ∈ E, and said to be
rejected in E if some b ∈ E attacks a. The set of rejected ar-
guments in E is denoted by E−. An argument that is neither
accepted nor rejected in E is said to be undecided in E. An
argument a is defended by E if every argument that attacks a
is attacked by some argument in E. An extension E of A is
complete if it is conflict-free and, a ∈ E iff a is defended by
E. The least complete extension under the containment or-
dering exists and is called the grounded extension. It reflects
a strongly sceptical attitude towards accepting arguments. An
extension E of A is stable if it is conflict-free and for every
argument a ∈ S\E there is an argument in E that attacks a.
A semantics is defined to be a set of extensions: the
grounded semantics consists only of the grounded extension,
and the stable semantics is the set of stable extensions. There
are many other semantics, including the preferred, semi-
stable, ideal, and eager semantics. These are all formed as
structurally-defined subsets of the set of complete extensions.
Such semantics will be called completist. There are also sev-
eral other semantics that are not completist, notably the naive,
stage, and CF2 semantics. In this paper we focus on the
grounded and stable semantics, since they are the semantics
most commonly employed by existing languages. However,
some results extend more broadly, to all completist semantics.
Each semantics implicitly expresses a criterion for what ar-
guments can coherently be accepted together, given an argu-
mentation framework. Each extension in the semantics repre-
sents a “reasonable” adjudication, according to that criterion,
of the arguments in the argumentation framework. Thus the
grounded semantics is highly sceptical while the stable se-
mantics requires that no argument is left undecided.
Structural properties of an argumentation framework can
influence the relationship between various semantics. An ar-
gumentation framework is well-founded if there is no infinite
sequence of arguments a1, a2, . . . , ai, ai+1, . . . such that, for
each i, ai+1 attacks ai. Such argumentation frameworks have
a single complete extension, which must be the grounded ex-
tension, in which every argument is either accepted or re-
jected [Dung, 1995]. Every completist semantics for such
argumentation frameworks consists of this single extension.
Computational Complexity
We can view a complexity class as a set of decision problems.
We assume the reader has knowledge of the polynomial com-
plexity hierarchy (see, for example, [Johnson, 1990]). We
use P to refer to the class of problems solvable in polynomial
time. PSPACE is the class of decision problems solvable in
polynomial space. It contains the entire polynomial hierarchy
PH . As usual, the notation CD, where C and D are complex-
ity classes, refers to the class of problems that can be decided
by an algorithm of complexity C with calls to a D oracle.
To address counting aims in strategic argumentation we
need to consider the complexity class PP and related classes.
Roughly, PP is the class of decision problems that have more
accepting paths than rejecting paths in a nondeterministic
Turing machine. A complete problem for PP is to decide
whether a given Boolean formula is satisfied by more than
half of the assignments to its variables. PP contains both
NP and coNP, but there is an oracle relative to which ∆p2 is
not contained in PP [Beigel, 1994]. NPPP and NPNP
PP
lie be-
tween the polynomial hierarchy and PSPACE, that is, PH ⊆
NPPP ⊆ NPNPPP ⊆ PSPACE. The counting polynomial-time
hierarchy [Wagner, 1986] is the extension of the polynomial
hierarchy that also involves the complexity class PP.
Figure 2 shows some complexity classes in the counting
polynomial hierarchy, under the containment ordering. The
containments are believed by the majority of complexity the-
orists to be strict, but the strictness remains open. Complete
problems of a complexity class are the hardest problems in
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that class. Consequently, if Problem A is (say) in ∆p2 and
Problem B is Σp2-complete then, in an informal sense, B is
harder than A.
Strategic Argumentation
Strategic argumentation provides a simple model of dynamic
argumentation. Originally [Roth et al., 2007; Governatori et
al., 2014] it was formulated for a concrete argumentation sys-
tem based in a defeasible logic, but we will use the model of
[Maher, 2016b] which is defined in terms of abstract argu-
mentation. In strategic abstract argumentation, players take
turns to add arguments to an argumentation framework. At
each turn, the player adds arguments so that the argumenta-
tion framework is in a desired state. We refer to such states
interchangeably as desired outcomes or strategic aims of the
player. A player loses the strategic argumentation game when
she is unable to achieve her desired outcome. In general, both
players can win if the argumentation reaches a state that is de-
sired by both players, but in this paper we consider an adver-
sarial setting where the players’ aims are mutually exclusive.
We say that a player is honest if she plays rationally with the
aim of winning, with only information that is revealed by play
of the game (that is, she does not participate in corruption).
Strategic abstract argumentation is formalized as follows
[Maher, 2016b]. We assume there are two players, a propo-
nent P and her opponent O. A split argumentation frame-
work (ACom,AP ,AO,) consists of three sets of argu-
ments: ACom the arguments that are common knowledge
to P and O, AP the arguments available to P , and AO the
arguments available to O; and an attack relation  over
ACom ∪AP ∪AO. AP is assumed to be unknown to O, and
AO is unknown to P . Each player is aware of  restricted
to the arguments they know. Thus, the privacy of a player’s
arguments is a strategic advantage. We assume that P ’s de-
sired outcome is that a distinguished argument a (called the
focal argument) is accepted, in some sense, while O’s aim
is to prevent this. Starting with P , the players take turns in
adding sets of arguments to ACom from their available argu-
ments, ensuring that their desired outcome is a consequence
of the resulting argumentation framework2. As play contin-
ues, the set of arguments that are common knowledge ACom
becomes larger. When a player is unable to achieve her aim
on her turn to play, she loses.
We represent a split argumentation framework as a graph
as follows: each argument is a vertex, and there is a directed
edge from A to B iff A attacks B. Arguments inAP are grey
and arguments in AO are white. Thus the split argumenta-
tion framework in Figure 1 is (∅, {A,C}, {B1, B2, D},),
where is the relation described by the edges in the figure.
It might be questioned whether it is necessary to allow
players to add more than one argument. Indeed, several per-
suasion games permit players to add only a single argument
at a time [Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000; Amgoud and Cay-
rol, 2002; Modgil and Caminada, 2009]. Such games have
a different motivation: to give an operational characteriza-
tion of argumentation semantics. In our context, where the
2 Each player’s move is a normal expansion [Baumann and
Brewka, 2010].
A B C
F
G
D
E
H
Figure 3: A strategic argumentation game.
game determines the winner of a dispute, it seems unfair that
a player with a greater number of arguments is unable to take
advantage of that fact. The following example shows that the
restriction of moves to a single argument can prevent a player
from responding to her opponent, even though she has the
arguments to win.
Example 2 Consider the split argumentation framework pre-
sented in Figure 3, where P ’s desired outcome is that the ar-
gument A is accepted. In any completist semantics, the cor-
responding argumentation framework supports A. This fol-
lows from the fact that the argumentation framework is well-
founded [Dung, 1995]. P can be seen to be in a dominant
position to defend A when all the arguments are known, since
all O’s arguments that attack A are themselves attacked by
arguments of P (G and H) that are not attacked.
Now consider the following sequence of moves: P plays A,
O responds with B, and then the arguments C, D and E are
played in turn. O then plays F. At this point, O’s arguments
B and D are undefeated, since F attacks their attackers. If P
is only allowed to play a single argument, then she loses. On
the other hand, if P can play both G and H then she wins.
With hindsight, in this game, it appears that P has made
poor choices of which argument to play. However, P has no
knowledge of O’s arguments, and so, to P , the choice be-
tween C and G to attack B is entirely symmetric, as is the
choice between E and H to attack D.
[Maher, 2016b; Maher, 2016a] identifies several plausible
strategic aims that the proponent P might have under an ar-
gumentation semantics σ:
1. Existential: a is accepted in at least one σ-extension
2. Universal: a is accepted in all σ-extensions
3. Unrejected: a is not rejected in any σ-extension
4. Uncontested: a is accepted in at least one σ-extension
and is not rejected in any σ-extension
5. Plurality: a is accepted in more σ-extensions than it is
rejected
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6. Majority: a is accepted in more σ-extensions than it is
not accepted
7. Supermajority: a is accepted in at least twice as many
σ-extensions than it is not accepted
The existential and universal aims are credulous and scep-
tical acceptance, respectively. In addition to the above aims
for P , O aims to “spoil” or prevent such aims from being
achieved. O’s aims are the negation of the above aims. Be-
cause the grounded semantics consists of a single extension,
all these aims, except Unrejected, are identical under that se-
mantics. Furthermore, the Unrejected aim has the same com-
plexity as the other aims under the grounded semantics, so
we will not distinguish the different aims under this seman-
tics. Under the stable semantics no argument is undecided.
Consequently, the Plurality and Majority aims are identical
for the stable semantics.
The problem of verifying that an aim is satisfied by some
state of strategic argumentation is a fundamental part of each
move in a game, and of the exploitation of corrupt behaviour.
The Aim Verification Problem for P
Instance An argumentation framework (ACom,), an ar-
gumentation semantics, and an aim.
Question Is the aim satisfied under the given semantics by
the given argumentation framework?
The Desired Outcome problem [Maher, 2016b] is the
problem that a player must solve at each step of a strategic
abstract argumentation game. It involves identifying that the
player has a legal move.
The Desired Outcome Problem for P
Instance A split argumentation framework
(ACom,AP ,AO,) and a desired outcome for P .
Question Is there a set I ⊆ AP such that P ’s desired
outcome is achieved in the argumentation framework
(ACom ∪ I,)?
It is not difficult to see that this problem can be solved by a
non-deterministic algorithm with an oracle for the Aim Veri-
fication problem.
We refer to these problems (and the corresponding prob-
lems for O) as AVP (AVO) and DOP (DOO).
Playing strategic argumentation involves solving the de-
sired outcome problem at each turn. We can formulate this as
a deterministic polynomially bounded algorithm with an ora-
cle for the player’s desired outcome problem. Consequently,
we can identify the complexity of playing strategic argumen-
tation as PDO, where DO is the complexity of the desired
outcome problem.
Combining results of [Maher, 2016b; Maher, 2016a], for
P , with new results for O we can identify the complexity of
these problems and, consequently, the complexity of normal,
honest play in a strategic argumentation game. Honest play
involves the solving of a polynomially-bounded sequence of
Desired Outcome problems. We use the suffix “-c” to indicate
that the problem is complete for the given class.
Theorem 3 The complexity of Aim Verification and Desired
Outcome problems and the complexity of honest play, for both
P and O, are as stated in Table 1.
Corruption and Audit
Although corruption takes place away from the strategic ar-
gumentation game, it has no point unless it is exploited to al-
ter the outcome of the game. Thus the presence of corruption
might be detected from the play of the game. Conversely, cor-
rupt players will attempt to disguise their exploitation of cor-
ruption as honest play. The computational cost of disguising
corruption is generally greater than the computational cost of
honest play, which is the source of the notion of resistance to
corruption [Maher, 2016b].
However, in the model of [Maher, 2016b], for some aims
under the stable semantics there is no resistance to collusion.
That is, the cost of disguising corruption is no greater than
the cost of honest play. Thus there is no computational dis-
incentive to collusion for those aims. We seek to remedy this
weakness.
It is helpful to view the verification of honest play as an
audit. There are two parts to an audit: standards that should
be upheld, and testing for/verification of compliance to those
standards. In the model of [Maher, 2016b] there is only one,
implicit standard for play: that a player may not abandon play
while she can make a move. However, we saw in Example 1
that this standard is not sufficient: obvious cases of collusion
or espionage remain compliant with this standard. Hence, we
must normalize a higher standard of play so that compliance
to that standard is a better test of honest play. However, a
standard is only effective if it does not interfere with honest
play. That is, a player should never face a choice between fol-
lowing the standard and improving her chances of winning.
Example 1 and the discussion in the Introduction suggested
three possible restrictions on a player’s moves that would en-
force higher standards. Of the three, the avoidance of self-
inflicted injury requires refinement, since self-injury cannot
always be avoided, and its suitability as a standard remains
open. So we consider the other two. We say a move is ef-
fective if the resulting argumentation framework satisfies the
player’s aim. A minimal effective (or, simply, minimal) move
by a player is an effective move such that no subset of that
move is effective. A minimal cardinality move is an effective
move such that no move with fewer arguments is effective.
The minimum cardinality restriction forces the omission
of moves that are needed to win, as the following example
shows. Thus it is not suitable as a standard.
Example 4 Consider the strategic argumentation framework
in Figure 4, and play that proceeds as follows: P plays A, O
plays B1 and B2, and P plays C1 and C2. At this stage O
must defeat both C1 and C2, and she has two alternatives:
(1) play E, which attacks both C1 and C2, or (2) play both D1
and D2, each attacking one of the C arguments. Clearly (1)
is the minimum cardinality move. However, P then responds
with F, and wins. In (2), the play of F is insufficient for P ,
since B2 remains undefeated. Hence O wins.
Thus, we focus on avoiding the play of redundant argu-
ments, that is, the standard of playing minimal sets of argu-
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AVP AVO DOP DOO HonestP HonestO
Grounded semantics in PTIME in PTIME NP-c NP-c ∆p2-c ∆
p
2-c
Stable semantics
Existential NP-c coNP-c NP-c Σp2-c ∆
p
2-c ∆
p
3-c
Universal coNP-c NP-c Σp2-c NP-c ∆
p
3-c ∆
p
2-c
Unrejected coNP-c NP-c Σp2-c NP-c ∆
p
3-c ∆
p
2-c
Uncontested coNP-c NP-c Σp2-c NP-c ∆
p
3-c ∆
p
2-c
Plurality/Majority PP-c PP-c NPPP-c NPPP-c PNP
PP
-c PNP
PP
-c
Supermajority PP-c PP-c NPPP-c NPPP-c PNP
PP
-c PNP
PP
-c
Table 1: Complexity of Aim Verification and Desired Outcome problems, and honest play, for P and O under the grounded
and stable semantics, for selected aims (of P ).
A
B1
B2
C1
C2
D1
D2
F
E
Figure 4: Split argumentation framework demonstrating
non-dominance of minimum cardinality moves.
ments that achieve the players strategic aim. As observed
above, this standard is only reasonable if it does not eliminate
an advantageous move for a player. A move m1 is dominated
by move m2 if, in every state of the game, and for every fu-
ture sequence of moves, m2 leads to better or equal outcomes
than m1 for the player making the move.
Theorem 5 Every non-minimal move is dominated by a min-
imal move.
A player gains no advantage by making a non-minimal
move, and such moves can be disadvantageous
Proof Consider the argumentation frameworkA resulting af-
ter P (say) has made a minimal move S, and the argumenta-
tion frameworkA′ resulting from the move S∪U , where U is
non-empty (the unnecessary arguments). Consider a potential
move M by the opponent O. There are three cases:
1. M is an effective move in A, but not in A′. In this case,
the presence of U preventsM inA′. However, in response, in
A, P can play U as her next move, neutralizing the effect of
M . This leaves the game in A in a similar state as A′, except
that O’s move M has been exposed. O’s next move in A is
more constrained because elements of M might attack some
of O’s remaining arguments.
Furthermore, in A, P can play a minimal subset of U .
2. M is an effective move in both A and A′. In this case,
if P has an effective move M ′ in A′ then M ′ ∪ U is an ef-
fective move inA and it leavesA in the same state asA′. On
the other hand, that P has an effective move N in A does not
imply that she has an effective move in A′. Example 1 (and
Figure 1) gives an example of a split argumentation frame-
work where a non-minimal move (by O, in that case) leads to
her losing the game.
3. M is an effective move in A′, but not in A. In this case,
U has enabled a move by O in A′ that is not effective in A.
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Thus, imposing the higher standard of minimal moves does
not impact honest play. There is no direct link between im-
proved resistance to collusion and a higher standard of play,
but we will see that normalizing the play of minimal moves
does lead to an improvement in resistance to collusion.
There are several computational problems we must address
in order to determine whether or not resistance to corruption
still holds under this higher standard. The Minimality Prob-
lem is to verify that a given effective move is a minimal move.
The Minimality Problem for P
Instance A split argumentation framework
(ACom,AP ,AO,), an argumentation semantics, an
aim for P , and a move M ⊆ AP that achieves the aim for P .
Question Is M a minimal set that achieves the aim under
the given semantics? That is, is there no subset N ⊂M such
that P ’s desired outcome is achieved in the argumentation
framework (ACom ∪N,)?
It is clear that the complement of this problem can be
solved by a non-deterministic algorithm that guesses N and
uses an oracle for the Aim Verification problem.
The higher standard imposes some computational cost for
honest play. Each move must also verify that the proposed
move is minimal. However, it turns out that this additional
work does not affect the computational complexity of hon-
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est play. This is because the complement of the Minimality
problem has the same complexity as the Desired Outcome
problem; both do nondeterministic search using an oracle for
Aim Verification. The complexity of the Minimality problem
and honest normal play are presented in Table 2.
We now turn to the complexity of disguising corruption
under this higher standard. We first address the problem of
disguising the exploitation of collusion to allow P to win. We
begin by assuming that only O is required to play minimal
moves, because it is the loser whose strategy must withstand
scrutiny.
The two players must arrange an alternating sequence of
moves by P and O such that each move is effective and O’s
moves are minimal. Furthermore, after P ’s last move there
must be no move for O (that is, O must lose).
The Winning Sequence with Minimality Problem for P
Instance A split argumentation framework
(ACom,AP ,AO,) and a desired outcome for P .
Question Is there a sequence of moves such that P wins
and O always plays minimal moves?
This problem can be solved by a non-deterministic algo-
rithm that guesses moves for P and O and uses oracles for
the aim verification problem for P and O, and the minimality
problem for O, to ensure that the moves are valid. Finally, an
oracle for the (complement of) the desired outcome problem
for O is needed to verify that O loses. We denote this prob-
lem by WSMP , and the similar problem for O is WSMO.
The variant where both P and O must play minimal moves is
denoted by WSM ′. This variant reflects a strict application
of the standard to both players.
Theorem 6 Consider strategic argumentation under the
standard that every move must be minimal. The complexity
of verifying that a move is minimal, the complexity of normal,
honest play, and the complexity of Winning Sequence prob-
lems, for both P and O, are as stated in Table 2.
In the case of espionage, one player, say P , illicitly
learns her opponent’s arguments AO and desires a strat-
egy that will ensure P wins, no matter what moves O
makes. A strategy for P in a split argumentation frame-
work (ACom,AP ,AO,) is a function from a set of com-
mon arguments to the set of arguments to be played in the
next move. A sequence of moves S1, T1, S2, T2, . . . result-
ing in common arguments AP,1Com,AO,1Com,AP,2Com,AO,2Com, . . .
is consistent with a strategy s for P if, for every j, Sj+1 =
s(AO,jCom,AP ). A strategy for P is winning if every valid se-
quence of moves consistent with the strategy is won by P .
The Winning Strategy with Minimality Problem for P
Instance A split argumentation framework
(ACom,AP ,AO,) and a desired outcome for P .
Question Is there a winning strategy for P that only makes
minimal moves?
Under the higher standard we impose, strategic argumen-
tation is resistant to collusion (espionage) if the complexity
A B C D
E F
G H
Figure 5: A strategic argumentation game
of the Winning Sequence (Winning Strategy) with Minimal-
ity problem is greater than the complexity of honestly playing
the strategic argumentation game, under the widely-believed
complexity-theoretic assumption that the polynomial hierar-
chy does not collapse. In that case, the computational work
needed to exploit the corrupt behaviour is greater than that
required to simply play the argumentation game.
Theorem 7 Under the grounded and stable semantics, and
for every desired outcome under consideration, the Winning
Sequence Problem with Minimality has greater complexity
than normal, honest play.
Consequently, in such situations, strategic argumentation
is resistant to collusion.
Thus, we see that the higher standard of behaviour required
of players has the desirable side-effect that all aims under the
stable semantics are resistant to collusion.
The restriction to minimal moves does not affect resistance
to espionage.
Theorem 8 Under every completist semantics, and for every
desired outcome under consideration, the Winning Strategy
Problem with Minimality is PSPACE-complete.
Consequently, in such situations, strategic argumentation
is resistant to espionage.
Beyond Resistance?
Rather than rely on resistance to collusion, we might want
to impose even higher standards, so that collusion cannot be
disguised. We briefly explore this possibility.
The first question is: Is the current high standard sufficient
to prevent the disguise of collusion? Unfortunately, the an-
swer is no, as the following example shows.
Example 9 Consider the split argument framework depicted
in Figure 5, where arguments in AP are grey and arguments
in AO are white, and A is the critical argument. If P desists
from playing H then P will win, since the two arguments
attacking A (B and C) can be attacked by P ’s arguments
F and G, which cannot be attacked by O. For example, the
sequence of moves: A,B, F,E,G results in P winning.
On the other hand, the sequence of moves:
A,E,H,B,C,D results in O winning. Thus, P and O
can collude to ensure O wins.
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MinP MinO HonestMinP Honest
Min
O WSMP WSMO WSM
′
Grounded semantics coNP-c coNP-c ∆p2-c ∆
p
2-c Σ
p
2-c Σ
p
2-c Σ
p
2-c
Stable semantics
Existential coNP-c Πp2-c ∆
p
2-c ∆
p
3-c Σ
p
3-c Σ
p
2-c Σ
p
3-c
Universal Πp2-c coNP-c ∆
p
3-c ∆
p
2-c Σ
p
2-c Σ
p
3-c Σ
p
3-c
Unrejected Πp2-c coNP-c ∆
p
3-c ∆
p
2-c Σ
p
2-c Σ
p
3-c Σ
p
3-c
Uncontested Πp2-c coNP-c ∆
p
3-c ∆
p
2-c Σ
p
2-c Σ
p
3-c Σ
p
3-c
Plurality/Majority coNPPP-c coNPPP-c PNP
PP
-c PNP
PP
-c NPNP
PP
-c NPNP
PP
-c NPNP
PP
-c
Supermajority coNPPP-c coNPPP-c PNP
PP
-c PNP
PP
-c NPNP
PP
-c NPNP
PP
-c NPNP
PP
-c
Table 2: Complexity of Minimality problems, normal play with the minimality standard, and Winning Sequence problems for
P and O under the grounded and stable semantics, for selected aims (of P ).
A
B
C D
Figure 6: A strategic argumentation game
This example suggests that a variation of the avoidance of
self-inflicted injury might be needed to detect collusion more
thoroughly. Which leads to a second question: is it possible
to impose a high enough standard that any collusion cannot
be disguised as compliant play? Again the answer is no.
Consider the argumentation game in Figure 6 under the
grounded semantics, where A is the critical argument. After
P playsA,O has the choice of playingB orC. Depending on
this choice, either P or O will win. If P and O collude they
can determine the outcome, but any real restriction imposed
by a standard will restrict to one possible outcome, so it can-
not be a justified standard. Thus any collusion in this game
cannot be detected by imposing higher standards, assuming
standards are required not to interfere with honest (i.e. non-
corrupt) play.
Hence, we see that collusion cannot be prevented simply by
imposing higher standards. Indeed, it appears that collusion is
detectable iff the argumentation game with standards is fixed:
there is only one possible winner. We must continue to rely
on computational difficulty to discourage corruption.
Defeasible Rule Languages
The results above for abstract strategic argumentation ex-
tend to concrete argumentation languages based on defeasi-
ble rules. This includes structured argumentation systems
such as ASPIC [Amgoud et al., 2006] and its derivatives,
and assumption-based argumentation (ABA) [Bondarenko et
al., 1997], under grounded or stable semantics. But it also
includes a range of other languages such as defeasible log-
ics [Billington et al., 2010; Maier and Nute, 2010], Ordered
Logic [Laenens and Vermeir, 1990], LPDA [Wan et al.,
2009] and Rulelog [Grosof and Kifer, 2013], among many
that correspond to the grounded semantics. Similarly, several
concrete languages correspond to the stable semantics: de-
feasible logics under stable model semantics [Antoniou et al.,
2000; Maier, 2013] , DEFLOG [Verheij, 2003], and ASPDA
[Wan et al., 2015], among others. The emulation of abstract
argumentation by these languages [Maher, 2015] is the key
element in carrying complexity results for abstract strategic
argumentation to these languages.
Conclusion
Raising the standard of play to require minimal moves makes
exploitation of collusion more difficult because it eliminates
an easy way to introduce arguments into the common pool.
Surprisingly, however, we found that it also improved resis-
tance to collusion. Such behaviour should not be expected, in
general, from the raising of standards; it will depend, in part,
on the complexity of verifying the standard.
We briefly touched on the possibility of even higher stan-
dards: requiring a minimum cardinality move, or a move that
avoids self-inflicted injury. It remains an interesting open
problem whether the minimality standard can be strengthened
along those lines, and how that might affect resistance to col-
lusion.
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